KRBTGT and security

KRBTGT in Active Directory: what it is, risks and how to reset its password

KRBTGT is the account that signs every Kerberos ticket in an Active Directory domain. If an attacker obtains its key, they can forge access tickets to any resource in the domain, and those tickets stay valid until its password is changed, twice. This guide explains what it is, when it makes sense to change it and how to do it without breaking anything.

What the KRBTGT account is and what it does

KRBTGT is a built-in account that exists in every Active Directory domain. The Kerberos authentication service on domain controllers uses it to encrypt and sign all Kerberos tickets, including the TGTs (ticket-granting tickets) that users receive when they sign in. It cannot be deleted, nobody signs in with it and its password is generated by the system itself.

Because every ticket is signed with its key, the security of KRBTGT affects the whole domain. Read-only domain controllers (RODCs) have their own account in the krbtgt_number format, which is managed separately.

Golden Ticket: why a compromised KRBTGT is so serious

If an attacker obtains the KRBTGT key, they can forge valid Kerberos tickets for any user and access any resource in the domain. This is known as a Golden Ticket attack. Getting that key usually requires very high privileges in the domain beforehand, so it normally shows up in the advanced stages of an intrusion.

The danger is persistence: forged tickets don't depend on any user's password, so changing user or administrator passwords doesn't invalidate them. They keep working until the KRBTGT password is changed, and it has to be done twice.

When it makes sense to change the KRBTGT password

There are two clear scenarios. The first is a suspected or confirmed domain compromise: here the reset is part of the recovery, but it doesn't replace removing the attacker, because changing the password only invalidates forged tickets, it doesn't close the access they came in through.

The second is periodic rotation. Microsoft Defender for Identity flags as a security recommendation any KRBTGT account whose password was changed more than 180 days ago. If it has never been rotated, CISA warns that replication problems may appear because the credentials use legacy encryption (DES or RC4), so it's worth checking first that Active Directory replication is working properly.

  • After a domain compromise
  • Periodic rotation
  • If it hasn't been changed in over 180 days
  • First: check replication

How to reset it: twice, with a 10-hour wait

The procedure documented by Microsoft is done in Active Directory Users and Computers: enable Advanced Features, open the Users container, right-click the krbtgt account and choose Reset Password. The password you type doesn't matter, because the system generates a strong password on its own.

It has to be done twice, because KRBTGT keeps the two most recent passwords in its history: with a single change, an old password would still be valid. Between one change and the next you must wait at least 10 hours, which is the default maximum lifetime of user and service tickets; if those values have been modified in your domain, the wait must be longer than the configured value. If you use a custom password filter, the change may fail; Microsoft documents a workaround in article KB 2549833.

What the impact is and how to prepare for it

Resetting the KRBTGT password invalidates existing Kerberos tickets, and CISA warns that it can affect applications that depend on Active Directory. Non-Windows clients may fail to get new tickets until the current ones expire.

That's why it should be planned: pick a low-usage window, check replication health beforehand, notify whoever manages applications integrated with the domain and don't make both changes back to back, but respect the wait between them.

What to monitor to detect a possible Golden Ticket

There is no foolproof indicator, but the most common detection guides agree on several signs: service ticket requests (event 4769) with no prior TGT request (event 4768), tickets with an abnormal lifetime, use of RC4 encryption where the domain requires AES and a KRBTGT password that hasn't been changed for a long time.

No single sign is enough on its own, and some attack variants avoid a few of them, so it's worth combining them with authentication event monitoring and a periodic review of the domain's replication permissions.

Response plan and business continuity

An incident that reaches KRBTGT is a full domain incident: you have to contain it, investigate how the attacker got in, close that access, reset critical credentials and only then rotate KRBTGT twice. Having that order rehearsed reduces downtime and avoids a repeat compromise.

Frequently asked questions

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Is KRBTGT the same as a regular AD user?

No. It's a built-in Kerberos service account: it can't be deleted, nobody signs in with it and its password is generated by the system.

Why does the KRBTGT password have to be changed twice?

Because the account keeps its two most recent passwords in its history. Changing it twice removes the old ones and ensures none remains valid.

How long do you have to wait between the two changes?

At least 10 hours, the default maximum lifetime of user and service tickets. If those values have been modified in your domain, the wait must be longer than the configured value.

How often should it be changed?

Microsoft Defender for Identity recommends acting when the KRBTGT password hasn't been changed in over 180 days, and always after a domain compromise, once the attacker has been removed.

Can the change affect users?

Yes. It invalidates existing Kerberos tickets and can affect applications that depend on Active Directory, especially non-Windows clients. That's why it's planned for a low-usage window.

Is changing the KRBTGT password enough after an attack?

No. It invalidates forged tickets, but it doesn't close the access the attacker used to get in. First you have to contain and remove them.

Does this only apply to large companies?

No. It applies to any company with an Active Directory domain, including SMEs with their own servers. If you don't have your own domain, it's unlikely to affect you directly.

Can you help with the assessment and improvement plan?

Yes, we can prepare a technical review of your Active Directory environment and a prioritized improvement plan.

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